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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PRocEss-FEDERAL RIGHT TO CouNSEL IN NoNCAPITAL CASES IN STATE CouRTs-Petitioner was convicted in Illinois on pleas
of guilty to two indictments charging him with a non-capital offense. On writ of
error to the Supreme Court of Illinois, petitioner alleged that the trial court had
not inquired into his desire or ability to have counsel and that he had been convicted without having had assistance of counsel. His contention that the circumstances alleged constituted a violation of the State and Federal Constitutions was
overruled, and the judgments of the lower court affirmed.1 On certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, held affirmed. The due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not necesarily embody the rights assured by the
Sixth Amendment. The procedure in the trial court was not a denial of due
process. Four justices dissented. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 68 S.Ct. 763
(1948).
In federal criminal cases, the Sixth Amendment requires the court to make
inquiry into desire for counsel and to appoint counsel in the absence of an intelli-

1396 ID. 588, 72 N.E. (2d) 813 (1947).

706

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 47

gent waiver. 2 Although the standard of the Sixth Amendment has been ruled inapplicable to state criminal cases,3 the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on state
actions certain constitutional restrictions based upon "the fundamental principles
of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."4
,When the accused is charged with a capital offense, appointment of counsel is
required in the absence of competent wa_iver,;; and in neither capital nor noncapital cases is a plea of guilty an absolute waiver. 6 When the accused is charged
with a non-capital offense, a request for appointment of counsel may be denied in
the absence of prejudice to the accused, under the rule of Betts v. Brady,.1 the
leading case in this field. Later cases have qualified the rule by requiring the
appointment of counsel in cases of defendant's incapacity through ignorance8 or
youthfulness. 0 In the absence of these elements, a logical deduction from the
rule of Betts v. Brady is that no inquiry need be made into the desire or ability
of the accused to have counsel. The present case is but an application of the
Betts v. Brady rule. There is sound basis for objection to the Court's interpretation
in these cases of the "fundamental principles" test. Persons able to employ counsel
·must-be given time to arrange such etnployment, 10 and are entitled to effective
assistance of such counsel.11 Hence, in the absence of a showing of prejudice or
incapacity by the accused, ability to pay is alone the standard for invocation of
this federal right. 12 In addition, when counsel has been appointed by the court,
~ffective assistance of that counsel is required.13 This plainly tends to produce a
discrepancy between the federal rights of persons accused in states requiring appointment of counsel, and those accused in states not making such a requirement.14
Further, since the rule of Betts v. Brady incorporates the uncertain standard of
"prejudice," the rights of the accused are determined by the potentially fluctuating
2 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S.
275, 61 S.Ct. 574 (1941). 18 U.S.C., §687, Rule 44 (1946).
3 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937); Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947).
4 Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 at 316, 47 S.Ct. 103 (1926).
5 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S.
471, 65 S.Ct. 363 (1945); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485, 65 S.Ct. 370 (1945). See
principal case at 676.
G Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 65 S.Ct. 989 (1945). But see Carter v. Illinois, 329
U.S. 173, 67 S.Ct. 216 (1946); also 42 CoL. L. REv. 277 (1942).
7 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252 (1942).
s Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 65 S.Ct. 989 (1945).
9 De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663, 67 S.Ct. 596 (1947); Wade v. Mayo, 334
U.S. 672, 68 S.Ct. 1270 (1948); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 334 U.S. 836, 69 S.Ct. 184 (1948).
10 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932).
11 House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 65 S.Ct. 517 (1945).
12 Id. at 46: "We need not consider whether the state would have been required to
appoint counsel for petitioner on the facts alleged in the petition.••. It is enough that
petitioner had bis own attorney and was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult
with him."
1s White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 65 S.Ct. 978 (1945).
14 See listing of various state requirements of due process in appendix to Betts v. Brady,
319 U.S. 455 at 477, 62 S.Ct. 1252 q942).
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views of a majority of the Supreme Court.15 In addition, the distinction drawn
between capital and non-capital cases is poor, since it overlooks the basic need
for counsel in both instances. It would seem clearly the better policy to eliminate
the discrepancies and difficulties of application by imposing on state procedure
the same standards applied to federal cases.16
]. D. McLeod

1u See Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 66 S.Ct. 452 (1946); Foster v. Illinois, 332
U.S. 134, 67 S.Ct. 1716 (1947); Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1711 (1947),
for examples of difficulties involved in applying standards of the majority in the principal case.
Cf. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252 (1948) and Gryger v. Burke, 334
U.S. 728, 68 S.Ct. 1256 (1948).
16 Boskey & Pickering, "Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure," 13 UNIV.
Cm. L. REv. 266 (1946); ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM A.mrasT TO APPEAL
417-428 (1947). See Justice Black's dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 at 68,
67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947). Cf. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 68 S.Ct. 1270 (1948), decided
after the principal case, in which the Court, speaking through Justice Murphy, seems to
indicate a liberal application of the rule of Betts v. Brady which may presage a reappraisal
of the basis of the right to counsel in state cases, along the line suggested in Justice Black's
dissent in the Adamson case.

